His carrot: to invite legislators to discuss the legislative programme for the session with the Government so that members' own agendas can be incorporated.

According to his policy address, the Government, for its part, will take 'as much account as it can of members' views'.

But it is his stick, the threat to veto unwanted private members' bills, which caught the eye of even the most casual observer of local politics.

It is the first time in Hong Kong's history that the Governor has unambiguously spelled out he will not hesitate to veto bills tabled by legislators which, according to him, are not in line with the interests of the people of Hong Kong.

'For me, those interests must be paramount,' he said. 'If at any point I judge them to be in jeopardy, I may need to fall back on those constitutional powers which are in place for that purpose.

'Refusing assent to legislation would be a difficult decision for me to make. However, I would not shrink from doing so in a particular case if it were my honest view that this course of action would be in the best interests of Hong Kong.' The warning could not have come at a worse time. This was also the day when new legislators took the oath to serve the interests of the Hong Kong people.

It immediately sparked criticisms from newly elected legislators who charged the Governor with blackmailing the 'most representative Legco' into toeing the Government line. They warned the Governor to be careful about exercising his powers.

Mr Patten's warning called attention to one fundamental problem in the territory's evolving political system: who best represents the interests of the people? A British-appointed Governor who will leave the territory by July 1, 1997? Or Legislative Councillors elected by millions of Hong Kong voters? Legislators' answers are straightforward. It's the fully elected Legco which understands the public need.

There is no doubt the constitutional documents of Hong Kong, still a British colony, enable the Governor to reject bills endorsed by Legco. According to the Letters Patent: 'When a Bill passed by the Legislative Council is presented to the Governor for his assent he shall, according to his discretion, but subject to any Instructions addressed to him under our Sign Manual and Signetor through one of our Principal Secretaries of State, declare that he assents thereto, or refuses his assent to the same, or that he reserves the same for the signification of our pleasure.' But politics are not only about power, they are also about legitimacy, especially in a modern democracy.

With hindsight, the Governor might find his predecessors' position much preferable to his. There was almost no need for them to use or threaten to use such a veto power.

As Professor Norman Miners of the Hong Kong University, an expert in Hong Kong's constitutional affairs, says, in the whole 150-year history of the colony the assent has been refused only once, in 1946.

'In that year Sir Mark Young, acting on instructions from London, refused assent to the British Cinematograph Films Bill,' he says. 'Representations against the bill [which laid down a compulsory quota of British films in local cinemas] had been received by the secretary of state, and the Governor only received notification of this after the third reading.' The legislation was modified and enacted the following year.

This is no surprise. Before 1991 all bills tabled to Legco were from the Government and approved by the Governor-in-Council. Moreover, the legislature was dominated by government appointees and official members. That changed in the last Legco session when the majority of legislators were elected and the Government was saved only by an alliance of the Liberal Party and the pro-business members.

In November 1994, unionist Lau Chin-shek succeeded in ambushing the Government and pushed his amendments on the Employment Ordinance through a second reading when a number of members of the alliance failed to show up.

The Government was forced to withdraw the bill. Mr Lau quit Legco in protest and there were calls for officials to resign.

Now, with the whole council elected, and with the Democrats and their allies taking almost half the seats, more confrontations are likely.

A number of controversial private members' bills are already in the pipeline, such as a bill to scrap the Labour Importation Scheme.

The planned amendments to the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance which would allow more overseas judges to preside over cases could be another source of confrontation.

If the Governor sticks to his threat, clashes between him and a more assertive Legco are almost certain.

This will quickly emerge as a battle between a British appointee and a Hong Kong-elected chamber. The Governor will hardly gain sympathy locally or internationally.

But what about the Government's carrot: to lure legislators to work with the Government on the legislative programme. Will it work? The Government is unlikely to give in to legislators' demands over such bills as the importation of labour or the Court of Final Appeal.

Moreover, with just over 600 days to go, there is little the Governor can offer to lure major parties to compromise - especially when his relationship with the future sovereign, China, remains so antagonistic.

In 1947, when Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the last Viceroy of India, the British Government wanted to make use of his charisma in a final attempt to hold the Indian subcontinent intact rather than it breaking up into India and Pakistan. But even his charm was not enough.

Fifty years later, what of the Governor's political capital? Local parties are more interested in winning local support than helping him and his popularity has also declined.

Criticising the outgoing sovereign, with the Governor as its representative, is an almost cost-free exercise for local politicians.

The Governor's threat of veto, a big stick to tame Legco, could in fact expose his vulnerability in the last 21 months of the transition.

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